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Abstract
We propose a method for engineering security protocols that are aware of timing aspects.
We study a simplified version of the well-known Needham Schroeder protocol and the complete
Yahalom protocol, where timing information allows the study of different attack scenarios. We
model check the protocols using UPPAAL. Further, a taxonomy is obtained by studying and
categorising protocols from the well known Clark Jacob library and the Security Protocol Open
Repository (SPORE) library. Finally, we present some new challenges and threats that arise
when considering time in the analysis, by providing a novel protocol that uses time challenges
and exposing a timing attack over an implementation of an existing security protocol.
Keywords: timed automata, security protocols, model checking.
1 Introduction
The communication via a shared medium, like the Internet, is inherently insecure: anyone has
access to en route messages and can potentially eavesdrop or even manipulate the ongoing com-
munication. Security protocols are distributed programs specifically designed to achieve secure
communication over such media, typically exchanging messages built constructed using crypto-
graphic operations (e.g. message encryption).
Security protocols are difficult to design correctly, hence their analysis is critical. A particularly
successful model to analyze security protocols is the Dolev Yao model [16], in which the attacker is
assumed to have complete control over the network. Also, the model assumes ideal cryptography,
where cryptographic operations are assumed to be perfect. The Dolev Yao model is attractive
because it can be easily formalized using languages and tools based on formal methods. More-
over, the model has an appropriate level of abstraction, as many attacks are independent of the
underlying details of the cryptographic operations and are based only on combinations of message
exchanges plus knowledge gathered by the attacker during the execution.
Typically, Dolev Yao methods for formal verification of security protocols (among the propos-
als [27, 14, 10]) do not take time into account, and this choice simplifies the analysis. However,
security protocols, like distributed programs in general, are sensitive to the passage of time. Re-
cently, consideration of time in the analysis of security protocols has received some attention (see
Related Work below), but this attention has been focused mostly on timestamps.
In this paper1 we develop an analysis model for security protocols that explicitly takes into ac-
count time flowing during the execution of a protocol. In general, in the design and implementation
of a security protocol two aspects of timing must be considered at some stage:
1. Time can influence the flow of messages. For instance, when a message does not arrive in a
timely fashion (i.e. timeouts), retransmissions or other actions have to be considered.
2. Time information can be included within protocol messages (e.g. timestamps).
∗Contact author’s email is ricardo.corin@utwente.nl.
1An earlier version appeared in [11].
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Consider first (1) above. In general, the influence of time on the flow of messages is not usually
considered by current state of the art methods for analysing protocols. However, we believe it to be
crucial because (i) Even if the abstract protocol does not decide what action to take at a particular
moment of the execution (e.g. in the case of timeouts), the actual implementation will eventually
have to consider these issues anyway; (ii) The efficiency and security of the implementation depends
critically on these specific decisions; and (iii) The timing of message flows in a protocol can be
exploited by an attacker.
Now consider item (2) above. There, we believe that making judicious use of timing information
in a protocol has received attention but mostly in the limited setting of using time stamps as
opposed to nonces. However, time information can be used to influence message flows as well, as
we illustrate in Section 6.
Contributions Our study covers several issues in the study of time in security protocols.
• Firstly, in Section 2 we study which kinds of timing issues, like timeouts and retransmissions,
may arise in the study of security protocols. We then proceed in Section 3 to present a
method for the design and analysis of security protocols that consider these timing issues.
The method is based on modelling security protocols using timed automata [3]. In support
of the method we use UPPAAL [4] as a tool to simulate, debug and verify security proto-
cols against classical safety goals like secrecy and authentication, in a real time scenario,
using reachability properties. As examples, we analyse a simplified version of the Needham
Schroeder protocol [26] and the full Yahalom protocol [9] in Section 4.
• Secondly, in Section 5, we categorize all the protocols from the Clark and Jacob library and
the SPORE library into different (more abstract) patterns of message flows with timeouts.
We then analyse each abstract pattern, independently of the actual protocols, and establish
their timing efficiency and security.
• Finally, in Section 6 we illustrate some novel opportunities and difficulties that appear when
considering time in the design and analysis of security protocols:
– In Section 6.1 we give an example protocol that accomplishes authentication by exploit-
ing the timeliness of messages. The protocol uses time in a conceptually new way, by
employing time challenges as a replacement for nonces.
– As a second example of a novel difficulty in Section 6.2, we describe how timing at-
tacks [17] can be applied to security protocols, by describing an attack over Abadi’s
private authentication protocol [2]. Although these protocols can be modelled as timed
automata, thus permitting general verification, we leave the detailed verification as fu-
ture work since for this we need a model checker that is also probabilistic (like [13] or
[24]): our nondeterministic intruder of UPPAAL is too powerful, since it can always
guess correctly times and values even if the probability of guessing is negligible.
2 Timeouts and Retransmissions
To illustrate how time influences the analysis of security protocols (even when it does not explicitly
use timing information), consider the following protocol written in the usual notation.
1. A→ B : MAB
2. B → A : MBA
Here, first A sends message MAB to B, and later B sends message MBA to A. This high-level
view does not consider timing. To consider time, we first need to assume that both A and B have
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Figure 1: Left : Timeouts (i) typical (ii) windowed; Right : timeout actions (iii) chained abort and
(iv) retransmission
timers. In this paper, we do not require timers between parties to be synchronised (see below for
a discussion). The next step consists in distinguishing the different operations that occur, with
their respective times. In Step 1, it takes some time to create MAB. The other operation that
takes time is the actual sending of the message, ie. the time it takes MAB to travel from A to B.
This transmission time is unbounded, since the message may be lost or intercepted, and therefore
A may need to timeout : After A sends MAB, she starts a timer that will timeout if MBA (Step 2
of the above protocol) is not received after some waiting, say tA (Figure 1 (i)). Clearly, tA should
be greater than the time of creating MBA, plus the average time of sending both MAB and MBA.
In general, A does not need to start waiting for a response immediately after sending a message;
for instance, A could hibernate (or start doing another task) for some time sA before beginning
to expect the response MBA. This results in a windowed timeout (Figure 1 (ii)). Typically, the
values for sA and tA depend on implementation details. However, an implementation independent
quantitative analysis could already give an early indication of what attacks can be mounted for
some values that are no longer possible for others (eg. a smaller tA and a larger sA).
Another issue that is not considered either in previous approaches is that the action to be
taken when a timeout occurs is sensitive. Typically, the implicit assumption is that the protocol
should abort, as it is the case in Figure 1 (i). This means that the protocol party that reaches the
timeout deduces that a fault has happened. However, aborting may not consist only of stopping
execution altogether. For example, if we consider protocols with several parties, we may wish that
when a party timeouts it also communicates its decision to abort to other, still active parties. For
instance, consider the following protocol:
1. A→ B : MAB A starts timer expecting MBA
2. A→ S : MAS S starts session timer
3. B → A : MBA
Here, if A times out on Step 2, she could communicate the abort decision to S, as shown in in
Figure 1 (iii).
Aborting execution is not the only feasible action to perform after a timeout [25], and in
principle protocols could successfully execute when messages do not arrive at certain moments.
Even if we do assume that a fault occurred, aborting may not be the best choice: sometimes,
message retransmission is a better, more efficient and also more realistic option, as depicted in
Figure 1 (iv). In this case, a question which arises is whether to retransmit the original message
(MAB for Figure 1 (iv)), or to recompute some parts before resending the message. Here, the
tradeoff is, as usual, between efficiency versus security.
Time information can also be included in the contents of MAB and MBA. A typical value to
include is a timestamp, to prevent replay attacks. However, this requires secure clock synchroni-
sation of A and B, which is expensive (see Mills [29] for a security protocol to achieve this). In
fact, this is the reason for which Bellovin et al. recommend to switch to nonces in the Kerberos
protocol [7]. Recently, the analysis of security protocols using timestamps has received consider-
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able attention from the research community (see Related Work in Section 7). Therefore, in this
paper we do not pursue this direction.
3 A Method for Analysing Security Protocols
We use timed automata [3] to model protocol participants, and this has several advantages. Firstly,
our method requires the designer to provide a precise and relatively detailed protocol specification,
which helps to disambiguate the protocol behaviour. Secondly, timing values like timeouts need to
be set at each state, while retransmissions can be specified as transitions to other protocol states.
Once modelled as timed automata, the protocol can be fed to the real time model checker
UPPAAL, which allows the protocol to be simulated and verified. The simulation provides the
designer with a good insight of the inner workings of protocol, and already at this stage specific
timing values like timeouts can be tuned. Then the designer can proceed with verification of
specific properties. As usual in model checking, the verification of the protocol with UPPAAL is
automatic.
The resulting timed automata model is an informative and precise description of the secu-
rity protocol, and thus, it provides a practical way to strengthen implementations while keeping
efficiency in mind.
As a third and final step we propose to transfer timing information back to the high level
protocol description. This serves to highlight the role of time in the implementation, but also (as
we will demonstrate in Section 6.1), to make timing an integral aspect of the protocol design.
3.1 Timed Automata and UPPAAL
In this paper, the timed automata of Alur and Dill are used for modelling [3]. In general, timed
automata models have an infinite state space. The region automaton construction, however, shows
that this infinite state space can be mapped to an automaton with a finite number of equivalence
classes (regions or zones) as states [3]. Finite-state model checking techniques can then be applied
to the reduced, finite region automaton. A number of model checkers for timed automata is
available, for instance, Kronos [31] and UPPAAL [4].
Parallel composition of automata is one of the main sources for expressiveness. This operation
allows to decompose complex behaviour, thus supporting transparent modelling. When compos-
ing automata in parallel, we need also to provide some form of communication. For the timed
automata we use in this paper, communication comes in form of hand-shake synchronisation. Two
parallel automata can share a synchronisation channel, i.e. both have a transition labelled with
a complementing channel name, e.g. synchronise! in the example of Figure 2. These transitions
may only be taken together, at the same moment. In Figure 2 we see an example for a transition,
labelled by a guard that has to be true when the transition is taken, a synchronisation channel,
and a variable update.
Data transmission is typically modelled by a synchronisation, where global variables are up-
dated. These global variables contain the data that are transmitted.
var_v>const_c
synchronise!
var_w:=var_w+1
Figure 2: Example transition with guard, synchronisation and update
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Figure 4: Structure of our UPPAAL Model
Timed automata extend “classical” automata by the use of real-valued clock variables. All
clock variables increase with the same speed. For timed automata we make a difference between
a state and a location: a state is a location where all clocks have a fixed value. In this sense a
location symbolically represents an infinite set of states, for all the different clock valuations. In
Figure 3 an elementary fragment of timed automata is shown. When the transition from location
I to location II takes place, the clock clock is reset to 0. Location II may only be left at time D,
where D is a constant. The invariant clock<=D at location II enforces that the transition to III has
to be taken at time D.
I II
clock<=D
III
clock:=0 clock==D
Figure 3: Basic timed automaton fragment with a clock and a constant D
Typically, the initial location of an automaton is denoted by a double circle. We also make use
of committed locations, which have the property that they have to be left immediately. In most
cases committed locations are used to model a sequence of actions with atomic execution.
The properties verified by the model checker of UPPAAL are reachability properties, like “there
is a state where property p holds reachable from the initial state”, or the dual “in all reachable
states property p holds”. The latter is falsified if the model checker finds a state that does not
satisfy p. In this case a diagnostic trace from the initial state to the state that does not satisfy p
is produced by the model checker; it serves as counterexample.
We use this mechanism to find attacks. If we can characterize for example the fact that some
secret is not secret any more as a propositional property, and the model checker finds a state where
this property holds, the diagnostic trace describes a sequence of actions that leads to this state,
which gives precisely the attack.
Note that in this context verification comes very much in the guise of debugging. Finding an
attack requires an adequate problem model. Not finding an attack increases the confidence in the
modelled protocol, but does not exclude that attacks could be found in other models for the same
protocol.
3.2 Overview of the UPPAAL Model
Let us now describe the general form of our model, in some detail. We model the protocol par-
ticipants (initiator, responder, etc) and the intruder as timed automata. Additionally, we model
cryptography as another automaton, the cryptographic device, which acts as an impartial party
that regulates the access to data. In Figure 4 we illustrate a setting consisting of one initiator and
one responder. Here, boxes in bold represent our general intruder and the cryptographic device,
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while dashed boxes represent the actual initiator and responder. These participants use the cryp-
tographic device to perform operations, but communicate through the intruder (thus the intruder
is identified with the network itself, obtaining a Dolev Yao like intruder [16]). Our modelling is
modular, and allows us to “plug in” different participants (eg., in the analysis of the Yahalom we
add a server), while the bold boxes, ie. the intruder and the cryptographic device, are the core
model.
While modelling security protocols as timed automata in UPPAAL, we will focus on modelling
the times required by the principals to encrypt and decrypt values (and generate nonces), but not on
the actual time that takes the sending (transmission times are assumed to be unknown). Therefore,
for our results to be useful, we assume that computing times (e.g. cryptographic operations) are
not negligible w.r.t. communication times, and thus choices for timeout values depend both on
communication and computing times.
3.3 Modelling Cryptography
The automaton for a cryptographic device is presented in Figure 5. This cryptographic device
performs nonce generation and public key cryptography. Later we also use a device for symmetric
cryptography, which can be obtained from the one in Figure 5 in a straightforward manner. In fact,
our method allows different cryptographic devices to be plugged in as needed (eg. to add hashing).
Basically, the device model is a shared table containing pairs of plaintexts and keys. The first service
of the cryptographic device is to provide fresh nonces to the protocol participants (and also the
intruder). The process of nonce generation is started via synchronization on the gen nonce channel.
To model the new nonce creation, the local variable gennonce is incremented with the constant
seed plus the value of param1 that includes the ID of the requesting participant (this ensures that
initial generated nonces differ from each other). The number of possible nonces is bounded by
ensuring that gennonce is always smaller than a fixed constant MAX. After synchronization, a
global result variable is updated with a generated nonce, and the device finishes by synchronizing
on the finish nonce channel.
Encryption and decryption are modelled by two local arrays to the cryptographic device, namely
plain and key. When a party wants to encrypt some value d with key k, it synchronises with the
device via the channel start encrypt. If the device has still room in its tables, it stores d in the
plain array and k in the key array. As a result, it sets in the global variable result the index in
which d and k reside in the arrays. This index is the “ciphertext”. Upon decryption, the ciphertext
is provided to the cryptographic device, which then checks that the provided key is correct: Since
we model public-key encryption, the private key of a public key k is simply modelled as a function
f s.t. f(k) > MAX , so that private keys do not clash with generated nonces and hence are never
known by the attacker simply by guessing. In this simple case we simply let f(k) = 10k, which
since only one nonce is needed by the participants in the example protocol of Section 4.1, gives
enough room for the attacker to generate nonces.
State constructions Now that we have the cryptographic device, an honest principal can use
different state constructions to perform cryptographic operations. In Figure 6 we show the different
kinds of state constructions used in our models, which designers should use as building blocks for
the representation of protocol participants.
In the upper left of Figure 6 we see the building block for nonce generation. Here, a protocol
participant first resets the clock t, assigns its identity to variable param (used by cryptographic
device to provide different nonces to different participants) and then fires via the gen nonce channel.
Then the participant enters a state in which it waits until the time of nonce generation happens
(time gennonce), synchronises via the finish nonce channel and obtains the return value via
variable result. Encryption and decryption are analogous, and only differ in that they use two
parameters param1 and param2 (for plaintext and key in the former, and ciphertext and key in the
latter).
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gennonce:=
gennonce+seed
+param1,
result:=
gennonce
gen_nonce?
finish_nonce!
plain[index]:=param1,
key[index]:=param2,
result:=index,
index:=index+1
index<max
start_encrypt?
finish_encrypt!
start_decrypt?
param1<max,
key[param1]*10==param2
finish_decrypt!
result:=plain[param1]
Figure 5: Timed automaton for a Cryptographic Device
===========
GEN_NONCE:
t<=
time_gennonce
gen_nonce!
t:=0,
param:=ID
t>=time_gennonce
finish_nonce?
var:=result
=========
ENCRYPT:
t<=
time_encrypt
start_encrypt!
t:=0,
param1:=plain
param2:=key
t>=time_encrypt
finish_encrypt?
var:=result
DECRYPT:
t<=
time_decrypt
start_decrypt!
t:=0,
param1:=cipher
param2:=key
=========
t>=time_decrypt
finish_decrypt?
var:=result
Figure 6: State constructions: nonce generation (above), encryption (middle) and decryption
(bottom)
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SINT4
SINT5 ENCRYPT
SINT6 DECRYPT
SINT7 GEN_NONCE
SINT3
SINT2
SINT1
param1:=data,
param2:=pk
param1:=data,
param2:=IntruderPrivateKey
param1:=
IntruderPk
flag==true,
i<max_op
i:=i+1
pk:=AlicePk
pk:=BobPk
pk:=
IntruderPk
flag:=false
data:=pk,
flag:=false
msg:=data
init_msg?
resp_msg?
data:=msg,
i:=0
init_msg!
resp_msg!
i<max_op
i:=i+1
i<max_op,
data<100
i:=i+1
i<max_op
i:=i+1
data:=result,
flag:=true
Figure 7: Schema for the timed automaton for the Intruder
3.4 Modelling the Adversary
The intruder, presented in Figure 7, works basically as a Dolev Yao intruder [16]. The intruder
models the network itself, by acting as an intermediary of communication between the initiator
and responder. This is modelled by letting the intruder synchronise on both channels init msg
and resp msg. Upon synchronising by receiving a message, the intruder moves to state (SINT1),
where it saves the message msg in its local variable data and resets an index variable i which
bounds the total number of actions allowed to do before continuing execution. Then, the intruder
moves to state (SINT3), where it makes a nondeterministic choice for an action. More precisely,
it can decide to:
– Choose an identity in its local variable pk (State SINT4)
– Encrypt a value (State SINT5)
– Decrypt a value (State SINT6)
– Generate a nonce (State SINT7)
– Save variable data as message msg.
The intruder can then continue to perform these actions, choose to send a message or simply block
a message and continue the execution. Moreover, the intruder can also delay arbitrarily a message,
by waiting in state (SINT2).
Note that the intruder is independent of the actual protocol under study, and hence it is generic
to analyze protocols using public key encryption (although this intruder is not able to concatenate
messages; we extend it in the next section).
4 Analysing Protocols
We first consider a simple protocol to illustrate our technique. Later, we move on to analyse the
more complex Yahalom protocol.
4.1 An Example Protocol
In this section we study and model in UPPAAL a simplified version of the Needham Schroeder pro-
tocol, thoroughly studied in the literature (see eg. [26]). Differently from the Needham Schroeder
protocol whose goal is to achieve mutual authentication, our simpler protocol aims at authenticat-
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ing the initiator A to a responder B only (we do not lose generality here, this is just a simplification
to improve presentation). The protocol is as follows:
1. A→ B : A
2. B → A : {NB}KA
3. A→ B : {NB}KB
In the first message, the initiator A sends a message containing its identity to the responder
B. When B receives this message, it generates a nonce NB, encrypts it with the public key KA of
A and sends it back to A. Upon receipt, A decrypts this message with her private key, obtains the
nonce NB, reencrypts it with the public key KB of B and sends it back to B.
We can now move on to describe the actual initiator, responder and intruder. Both the initiator
and responder have local constants time out, which represent their timeout values. Also, the initia-
tor, responder and intruder have local constants time gennonce, time encrypt and time decrypt
that represent the time required to generate a nonce, encrypt a value or decrypt a value, respec-
tively for each principal.
The automata for the initiator and responder of our simple protocol presented above are given
in Figure 8 (the dashed transitions of the responder correspond to retransmissions, discussed in
Section 4.1.2). The initiator A starts her execution when activated via channel start (State SI0).
The actual identity of the initiator role is set via the global variable init id (this and other role
variables are chosen by the Init automaton, described below). The initiator saves init id as the
first message (see protocol message 1). Then, the initiator starts her protocol execution, by firing
via the channel init msg. After this, the initiator starts a clock t and waits for a response, or until
t reaches time out (State SI2). If the timeout occurs, the protocol is aborted (a retransmission
at this point would be equivalent to restart the protocol). If a response is received before the
timeout via the init msg channel, A tries to decrypt the received message msg. This takes time
time decrypt for the initiator. After the decryption, the initiator reencrypts the obtained nonce
(stored in result) and finally sends the last message via the init msg channel, setting to true its
local boolean variable finish.
The responder automaton B works similarly to the initiator. After receiving the start signal,
B waits for the message containing the claimed identity of A (State SR1). When received, B saves
the first message in the local variable claimed id. After this, B generates a nonce by contacting
the cryptographic device. When ready (State SR3), B encrypts the nonce with the value received
in Message 1 (we identify identities with public keys). After finishing the encryption (State SR4),
the message is sent and B starts to wait for a response (State SR5). If an answer comes before the
timeout, B decrypts the message and checks that the challenge is indeed the one B sent. If so, the
local boolean variable finish is set to true.
4.1.1 Verification
We wish to verify that our simple protocol indeed accomplishes authentication of A to B. To
this end, we will model check one session of the protocol containing one initiator, one responder
and one intruder. We use a special Init automaton that instantiates the initiator and responder
with identities (like A, B and I), and then starts the execution run by broadcasting via the start
channel. The init automaton is given in Figure 9.
The property we check, AUT , is shown in Table 1. AUT states that if we reach a state in
which the responder has finished executing but the claimed id (corresponding to the first message
of protocol) does not coincide with the actual identity of the initiator, the protocol is flawed.
Indeed, a state in which the initiator can “lie” and still force the responder to finish means that
authentication is violated. This is one of the possible forms of authentication failure. It is outside
the scope of this paper to illustrate different authentication flaws (see Lowe [27] and Cremers et
al. [12] for more on authentication notions).
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SI2
t<=time_out
SI1
SI0
INITIATOR:
DECRYPTENCRYPT
=========
start?
msg:=init_id init_msg!
t:=0 init_msg?param1:=msg,
param2:=init_id*10
param1:=result,
param2:=init_party
init_msg!
finish:=true,
msg:=result
GEN_NONCE
DECRYPT ENCRYPT
SR1
t<=time_out
RESPONDER:
===========
SR4SR5
t<=time_out
SR3SR2start?
msg:=resultresp_msg!t:=0
param1:=result
param2:=resp_id*10
resp_msg?
challenge
==result
finish:=true
na:=result
param1:=na,
param2:=
claimed_id
resp_msg?
claimed_id:=msg,
param1:=resp_id
t>=time_out
t>=time_out
Figure 8: Schemas of timed automata for the Initiator (top) and the Responder (bottom)
init_id:=
AlicePk
init_id:=
BobPk
init_id:=
IntruderPk
init_party:=
AlicePk
init_party:=
BobPk
init_party:=
IntruderPk
resp_id:=
AlicePk
resp_id:=
BobPk
resp_id:=
IntruderPk
resp_party:=
AlicePk
resp_party:=
BobPk
resp_party:=
IntruderPk
start!
Figure 9: Timed automaton for the Init automaton
AUT = E <> Responder.finish and
Responder.claimed id! = resp party
AUTy = E <> Initiator.finish and
Initiator.ticks< (Responder.time encrypt
+Responder.time gennonce+ Server.time encrypt ∗ 2
+Server.time decrypt)− 1
Table 1: UPPAAL properties
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α.1 A→ I :A 1. I(B)→ B : B
β.1 I(A)→ B :A 2. B → I(B) : {NB}KB
β.2 B → I(A) : {NB}KA 3. I(B)→ B : {NB}KB
α.2 I → A : {NB}KA
α.3 A→ I : {NB}KI
β.3 I(A)→ B : {NB}KB
Table 2: A man-in-the-middle attack (left) and a replay attack (right)
If we use a long timeout for B, i.e.
B.time out ≥ Intruder.time decrypt + Intruder.time encrypt+ A.time encrypt+ A.time decrypt
here UPPAAL finds a man-in-the-middle attack, presented on the left hand side of Table 2. This
attack is similar to Lowe’s attack [26], in which an attacker fools B into thinking he is commu-
nicating with A, while in reality A only talks to I. Of course, we could patch the protocol as
Lowe did. But, in the context of time, it is interesting to model-check the protocol with a tighter
timeout, ie. B.time out < Intruder.time decrypt+Intruder.time encrypt+A.time encrypt+
A.time decrypt. When this constraint is verified, the man-in-the-middle attack vanishes. Of
course, we cannot pretend that B knows the intruder’s times of encryption and decryption. Nev-
ertheless, B can set B.time out = A.time encrypt+ A.time decrypt, leaving no space for any
interruption.
A second attack which is independent of timeouts (even if we set B.time out = 0!) was also
found by UPPAAL; this time, the vulnerability is much simpler. We report it on the right hand side
of Table 2. This attack corresponds to a “reflection” replay attack [30]. This attack occurs when
the intruder simply replies B’s message. The attacker fools B into thinking its communicating with
himself, while it is not true in reality. Interestingly, suppose we change message 3 of the protocol
to 3′. A → B : {NB + 1}KB . Now, the above replay attack is prevented, since message 2 is not
valid as message 3 anymore. Of course, a patch a` la Lowe for both also prevents both problems:
1. A→ B : A
2. B → A : {B,NB}KA
3. A→ B : {NB}KB
Having find confirmation that our framework is capable of finding untimed attacks (and thus
confirming known attacks), we proceed to provide a good baseline to study extended security
protocols with timing issues, like timeouts and retransmissions.
4.1.2 Retransmissions
Consider again the automaton for the responder, given in Figure 8. In state SR4, the responder
sends the challenge {NB}KA , and waits for a response in state SR5. If the response does not arrive
before the timeout, the responder simply aborts. Now we consider possible retransmissions that
allow the protocol to recover and continue its execution. With timed automata, retransmissions
are easy to model by adding transition arrows from state SR5 to previous states of the automaton
(the dashed lines in Figure 8); These transitions are guarded, allowing to perform the action only
when the timeout is reached (ie., t >= time out). A further refinement not explored here would
be to add counters so that the number of retransmissions can be limited before aborting.
We consider two potential target states for the timeout of the Responder in SR5, namely states
SR3 and SR2. Choosing the former corresponds to retransmitting the exact same message that
was sent before, {NB}KA . On the other hand, linking the retransmission arrow to SR2 corresponds
to recomputing the whole message, by creating a new nonce N ′B and sending {N
′
B}KA .
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We implemented both strategies in our UPPAAL model. As can be expected, retransmitting the
exact message once has the effect of duplicating the timeout for B, and thus the man-in-the-middle
attack becomes possible even for tight timeout values. On the other hand, recomputing the whole
message preserves the security of the protocol, at a higher computational cost. This evidences that
indeed these design decisions are important for both security and efficiency, and a careful analysis
can help to choose the best timeouts and retransmissions for a practical implementation.
4.2 A Real Protocol
Having illustrated our approach with a simple example we now study a more realistic protocol, the
Yahalom protocol [9]. This protocol aims at authentication of A and B as well as key distribution
of A and B using a shared server S with whom both A and B share secret keys KAS and KBS .
Our choice is based on the fact that Yahalom is a complex and strong protocol, with no known
attacks over it (However, a modification proposed by Abadi et al. [8] has a known type-flaw attack).
Our aim is to study the protocol in more detail (and thus closer to an implementation) with timing
information. The protocol is as follows:
1. A→ B : A,NA
2. B → S : B, {NB, A,NA}KBS
3. S → A : {B,KAB, NA, NB}KAS , {A,KAB, NB}KBS
4. A→ B : {A,KAB, NB}KBS , {NB}KAB
Here we use symmetric encryption, and key KXY is shared between X and Y .
To model concatenation in an efficient way, we gathered several message components into a 16
bit field, thus keeping the state space as small as possible. In our case, we assume that nonces
have 4 bits, principal id’s 2 bits and keys 4 bits. To access these values, we use bit-wise and
with appropriate masks, and (left,right) bit shifts. Our intruder has also the capability to do the
shifts and mask, and we also removed the “public key” choice from the intruder of Figure 7. We
have modelled the protocol in UPPAAL (the initiator, responder, server and intruder are shown
in Figures 10 and 11).
As we did with the previous protocol, first we check whether authentication of A to B could
be falsified, using property AUT from Table 1. This property is not satisfied, confirming that
Yahalom is secure. Now we move to study time sensitive issues.
There are two places in which timeouts and retransmissions can occur in this protocol. The
first one is in Message 1: After A sends her message, she starts a timer waiting for message 3. Now,
suppose that a timeout occurs, and A wants to retransmit her message. We can be confident that
resending the same nonce NA will not affect security, since in any case it was already sent in the
clear in the first time. However, an interesting timing issue arises here. An answer that is received
too early by A could be suspicious, because some time must pass while B talks to S. If A knows
B’s and S’s encryption and decryption times, A could even deliberately “hibernate” (eg. to save
energy) until the response is likely to arrive (this models a windowed timeout, see Figure 1 (ii)).
We model checked this property by measuring the time after A sends her message, and a response
arrive (we count ticks, the dashed loop transition of the initiator in Figure 10). The specified
property is AUTy, shown in Table 1. This property is not satisfied, confirming that there is no way
that the initiator can receive a valid answer before the time required by the responder and server
to process A’s request. In an implementation, it is reasonable for A to set a timeout like above,
since it is realistic to assume that A can know the responder and server’s times of encryption and
decryption.
The second timeout is set by B after sending his message at step 2. If a timeout occurs,
the retransmission decision is more delicate: It is not clear whether B should resend the original
message, should recompute NB or whether B should abort, since clearlyNA cannot be recomputed.
Intuitively, NB could be reused. We modelled in UPPAAL the retransmission of the exact message
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SI2t2<=1GEN_NONCE
INITIATOR:
DECRYPT
ENCRYPT
=========
msg:=Init_id<<
NonceLength,
param1:=Init_id
start?
init_msg?
param1:=(msg>>MaxLength)&MaxMask,
param2:=Init_id+Sharedkey,
tempmsg:=msg&MaxMask
init_msg!
t:=0, t2:=0,
na:=result&NonceMask,
msg:=na|msg,
ticks:=0
param1:=result&NonceMask,
param2:=(result>>NonceLength*2)&KeyMask
na==((result>>
NonceLength)&NonceMask),
Init_party==(result>>
(NonceLength*2+
KeyLength))&AgentMask
msg:=(tempmsg<<
MaxLength)|result,
finish:=true
init_msg!
ticks:=ticks+1,
t2:=0
t<=time_out,
t2==1
GEN_NONCE
SR5
t<=time_out
ENCRYPTSR1
DECRYPTDECRYPT
===========
RESPONDER:
resp_msg?
claimed_id:=(msg>>
NonceLength)&AgentMask,
param1:=Resp_id
param1:=msg&MaxMask,
param2:=(result>>NonceLength)
&KeyMask
nb:=result&NonceMask,
param1:=(nb<<(NonceLength+AgentLength))
|(claimed_id<<NonceLength)|(msg&NonceMask),
param2:=Resp_id+Sharedkey
resp_msg?
param1:=(msg>>
MaxLength)&MaxMask,
param2:=Resp_id+
Sharedkey
msg:=(Resp_id
<<MaxLength)|result
resp_msg!
t:=0
start?
nb==(result&NonceMask),
claimed_id==(result>>(NonceLength+
KeyLength))&AgentMask
finish:=true
t>=time_out
Figure 10: Timed automata schemas for the Yahalom Initiator (top) and responder (bottom)
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=======
DECRYPT ENCRYPT
ENCRYPT
SERVER:
serv_msg?
id1:=(msg>>MaxLength)
&AgentMask,
param1:=msg&MaxMask,
param2:=id1+Sharedkey
na:=result&NonceMask,
id2:=(result>>NonceLength)&AgentMask,
nb:=(result>>(NonceLength+AgentLength))&NonceMask,
param1:=nb|(na<<
NonceLength)|(KAB<<NonceLength*2)|
(id1<<NonceLength*2+KeyLength),
param2:=id2+Sharedkey
msg:=(result1<<
MaxLength)|result
param1:=nb|(KAB<<
NonceLength)|(id2<<
NonceLength+KeyLength),
param2:=id1+Sharedkey,
result1:=result
start?
serv_msg!
finish:=true
INTRUDER:
=========
SINT5
ENCRYPT
SINT6
DECRYPT
SINT7
GEN_NONCE
SINT3
SINT2
SINT1
param1:=data,
param2:=IntruderKey
param1:=data,
param2:=
IntruderKey
param1:=
Eve
msg:=data
init_msg?
resp_msg?
data:=msg,
i:=0
init_msg!
resp_msg!
i<max_op
i:=i+1
i<max_op,
data<100
i:=i+1
i<max_op
i:=i+1
i:=i+1,
data2:=data
i<max_op data2:=data&MaxMask
data2:=data&NonceMask
data2:=
(data>>NonceLength)&AgentMask
data2:=(data>>MaxLength)&MaxMask
data2:=(data>>NonceLength*2)&KeyMask
data2:=
(data>>MaxLength)&AgentMask
serv_msg?
serv_msg!
i:=i+1
i<max_op
data:=data2
data:=data2
<<NonceLength
data:=
data2|data
data:=result
Figure 11: Timed automata schemas for the Server (top) and Intruder (bottom)
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abort
A B S1
2subm
3
4
Figure 12: An more detailed implementation of Yahalom
(as the dashed transition of the responder in Figure 10). When we model check again property
AUTy, we obtain that it is still unreachable, confirming that in that case an efficient retransmission
of the same message 2 by B is secure.
However, by observing the messages flow, we know that if B timeouts then it is very likely that
A has also reached its timeout and aborted (see Figure 1 (iv)). This mainly happens because since
A is unsure whether B is alive or not, and thus A’s timeout needs to be tight. If A knew that
B is alive and waiting for an answer from S, then A could extend its timeout. We then sketch a
more efficient implementation in Figure 12, in which at Message 2 B also sends a special subm
message notifying A of the submission to S. Then A can extend its timeout with more confidence
(the second dashed line in Figure 12). In the case subm is never received by A, she can send an
abort message to B. Of course, in this simple model the attacker can also send this messages,
thus performing denial of service attacks; in any case, our attacker is powerful enough to stop
communication altogether.
In summary, for the Yahalom protocol we obtain that retransmitting for the responder is secure,
and also that the initiator can be implemented to efficiently “hibernate” a safe amount of time
before receiving a response.
5 Taxonomy of Message Flows in Security Protocols
The flow of messages of many protocols follow a small set of specific patterns. By exploring the
well known Clark Jacob library [9] of authentication protocols and the Security Protocols Open
Repository (SPORE) [1], we were able to categorize the protocols in four categories, as shown
in Figure 13. To each pattern, we add the corresponding timeouts, and analyze their impacts
on security and efficiency. For the original references of the protocols, the interested reader may
consult the Clark Jacob library [9] and the SPORE library [1].
Not shown in this categorization are non-interactive protocols which do not wait for messages
and thus do not require timeouts. In this category fall the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol, the
CCITT X.509 simple pass protocol and the CAM protocol for mobile IP.
First, we discuss the simplest pattern in Figure 13 (i). This is a three-message exchange with
two participants. This pattern is the simplest and also the most secure one from timing point
of view, since timeouts can be set tight, due to the ping-pong nature of the exchanges. To this
pattern correspond both the example protocol of Section 4.1 and the one in Section 6.1, and also the
protocols CCITT.509 three pass, the Shamir Rivest and Adleman Three-Pass protocol, the ISO
XXX Key Three-Pass (and their repeated protocols), the SmartRight view-only protocol (from
SPORE) and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. With a fourth message from B to A in
the same fashion we find the Andrew Secure RPC protocol. Adding a third participant S, but still
doing ping-pong exchanges, we can add the Needham Schroeder symmetric key protocol and the
Denning Sacco protocol.
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Secondly, we identify three-party protocols, in which a server S also takes part in the communi-
cation (Figure 13 (ii)) but ping-pong exchanges are not anymore used. This pattern is potentially
unsafe and inefficient for A, since she has to wait until a long timeout as elapsed after the first
message before receiving an answer from S. This is due to the fact that three messages have to
be exchanged after A’s initial message. By consulting again the Clark and Jacob library and the
SPORE repository, we see that the Otway Rees protocol, the Gong mutual authentication pro-
tocol, the Woo-Lam mutual authentication protocol, the Carlsen protocol, and finally the Kehne
Schoenwalder Langendorfer (KSL) protocol all fall in this category. Adding ping-pong exchanges
before and after the exchanges of Figure 13 (ii) we find the Needham Schroeder Public key proto-
col. Adding a ping-pong exchange before Figure 13 (ii), and removing the last exchange gives us
the SPLICE/AS protocol.
Thirdly, we see a pattern to which only the Kao Chow protocol belongs in Figure 13 (iii). This
pattern is however better than (ii), since shorter and fewer timeouts are used: A needs to wait for
the timeout corresponding to only two messages (instead of three as in (ii)), and B has to wait for
only one timeout (comparing to two timeouts in (ii)).
Finally, in Figure 13 (iv) we see the last pattern. This pattern is worse than (iii) since B needs
to wait longer (for two messages instead of one in (iii)). However, it is unclear whether it is better
than (ii), which uses two timeouts of one message each: the actual efficiency and security depends
on the actual timeout values used in each case. This category is inhabited by the Yahalom and
Neuman Stubblebine protocols.
(iv)
A A B S A S B A B SB
(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 13: Typical message flows for authentication protocols
This taxonomy shows how authentication protocols can be categorized into a handful of pat-
terns. The efficiency and security that an implementation of a protocol will have depends on which
pattern the protocol follows, and thus it is useful to consider the patterns in isolation from the
actual protocols. In this paper we do not pursue this further, although as future work it would be
interesting to further analyze these abstract timing patterns induced from security protocols.
6 Beyond Model Checking: Novel Issues Considering Time
So far our method has been used for analysis purposes, ie. to model, classify and debug security
protocols as a source of hints for the improvement of the protocol implementations. We now
explore some ideas to improve the protocols themselves, and also present the threat of a more
subtle attack, based only on timing.
6.1 Using Time as Information: Timed Challenges
Sometimes it can be useful to include other timed information than timestamps, even if the clocks
are not synchronised. Consider the following protocol, obtained by omitting the encryption of the
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last message of the (patched) protocol of Section 4.1:
1. A→ B : A
2. B → A : {B,NB}KA
3. A→ B : NB
Even though NB is now sent in the clear, this protocol still achieves authentication of A to B,
although now the nonce obviously cannot be regarded as a shared secret. Still, the intruder can
prevent a successful run of the protocol (eg. by intercepting message 3), hence the protocol is as
strong as it was before in this respect.
Imagine now a situation in which there is a link from A to B in which data can be sent very
fast, but at a high cost per bit sent. For example, think that the high cost of sending information
comes from the fact that we have devices with a very limited amount of energy, like wireless sensor
networks for instance. Alternatively, in some networks, operators charge according to quality of
service, and many networks have asymmetric links (eg. Cable modem and ADSL).
Assume therefore that, sending NB in message 3 is expensive and not desirable. We propose a
solution based exclusively on using time as information. Let δAB be the average time it takes for
a message to be sent from A to B, and analogously δBA. Then consider the “timed” variant of the
above protocol, demonstrating how timing information is brought back to the (abstract) protocol
level (ie. Step 3 of Section 3):
1. A→ B : A
2. B → A : {B, tB}KA
3. A→ B : “ack” at time tB − δAB − δBA
In Message 2, instead of a nonce, B generates some random time value tB > δAB + δBA,
concatenates it with B’s identity and encrypts the message with A’s public key. Then, B starts a
timer t and sends the message. Upon reception, A extracts tB, waits time tB − δAB − δBA, and
replies the single bit message “ack”. When B receives this message, the timer is stopped and B
checks that t is sufficiently close to tB; if so, A is authenticated to B. Of course, the amount of
noise in the time measurements influences what we mean by “sufficiently close” above. Also, to
be realistic, the length in bits of tB should be small enough, otherwise B would be waiting too
long (on average); this would give an intruder the chance to guess tB, and answer the “ack” at the
appropriate time. Moreover, if encryption {·}· is deterministic, an attacker can record {B, tB}KA
and the answers tB in a table. As soon as A chooses tB again (and this is likely since tB is small)
and sends out {B, tB}KA , the attacker can notice the repeated message in its table since encryption
is deterministic, and hence the attacker can intercept the message (so it never arrives to B) and still
authenticate to A, since the attacker knows precisely when to send tB. Probabilistic encryption
solves this issue, although even then the attacker can simply guess tB and violate authentication
with non-negligible probability. However, we can strengthen the protocol as follows:
1. A→ B : A
2. B → A : {B, tB1 , . . . , tBn}KA
3. A→ B : “ack” at time tB1 − δAB − δBA
...
n+ 3. A→ B : “ack” at time tBn − δAB − δBA
For example, if tBi is of length 4 bits, for i ∈ [1..n], then the total answer is n bits, in comparison
with an answer of 4n bits required in the nonce protocol.
Of course, sending several short messages can be worse than sending one long message, in which
case our protocol would not be so useful. In general, the value of n must be chosen as small as
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possible, depending on the desired security and network latency. A fast network allows us to reduce
n and at the same time increment the length of tBi , for i ∈ [1..n].
Intuitively, the sent times of the “ack”’s represent information, and the above protocols exploit
that. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novel usage of time in security protocols.
Application This protocol can be used to authenticate a whole chain of network packets, as
follows. Suppose A has a large sequence of n packets which must be streamed to B over a network.
For instance, these packets can represent an audio stream in the Internet. We want to authenticate
the audio stream, but we do not wish to spend lots of resources on doing this. Let tBi ∈ {δAB +
δBA, δAB+ δBA+C} for some constant C and pi denote packet i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the protocol
becomes:
1. A→ B : A, n
2. B → A : {B, tB1 , . . . , tBn}KA
3. A→ B : p1 at time tB1 − δAB − δBA
...
n+ 3. A→ B : pn at time tBn − δAB − δBA
When tBi is δAB + δBA, it is the delay introduced by A is zero, ie. pi is sent right away.
However, when tBi is δAB + δBA + C, the delay is C. To be as efficient as possible, C should be
chosen to be the minimum amount of time that allows B to distinguish the delay modulated by A.
In this protocol, only one bit is authenticated per packet. However, the larger the n is, the
more confidence we can obtain of A’s authentication.
Discussion In this protocol, we are in reality exploiting a well-known feature of channel coding:
a so-called timing covert channel. In such a channel, the transmitting party modulates packets so
that information can be passed even if its not allowed by the environment. Our usage differs in
three ways:
• Firstly, we use a mixed approach, in which some information is sent in the standard channel,
and other is sent in the timing channel.
• A second difference is more fundamental than the previous one. Our usage of the timing
channel is purposely public, and there is no environment trying to stop the unauthorized
information flow. Timing is used only because of its practical advantages, namely low-
bandwidth.
• Finally, in our protocol both communicating parties do not initially trust on the other’s
identity, in principle: Indeed, ours is an authentication protocol.
6.2 Timing Leaks in an Implementation of the Private Authentication
Protocol
We now present a threat against an implementation of security protocols with branching: the
so called timing attack. We illustrate this by showing an attack over a careless implementation
of Abadi’s Private Authentication (PAP) protocol [2] (The second protocol). It is worthwhile
to mention that the protocol has been proved correct by Abadi and Fournet [21], in a setting
without time. We assume that each principal X has a set of communication parties SX , listing
the principals with whom X can communicate. The aim of the protocol is to allow an principal A
to communicate privately with another principal B. Here “privately” means that no third party
should be able to infer the identities of the parties taking part in the communication (i.e. A and
B) (PAP Goal 1). Moreover, if A wants to communicate with B but A 6∈ SB, the protocol should
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also conceal B’s identity (and presence) to A (PAP Goal 2). A run of the protocol in which A
wants to communicate with B proceeds as follows:
1. A generates a nonce NA. Then, A prepares a message M = {“hello”, NA,KA}KB , and
broadcasts (“hello”,M).
2. When a principal C receives message (“hello”,M), it performs the following three steps:
(a) C tries to decrypt M with its own private key. If the decryption fails, (which implies
that C 6= B), then C creates a “decoy” message {N}K (creating a random K, and
keeping K−1 secret), broadcasts (“ack”, {N}K) and finish its execution. If decryption
succeeds, then C = B (and so from now on we will refer to C as B). B then continues
to the next step.
(b) B checks that A ∈ SB. If this fails, i.e. A 6∈ SB, then B creates a “decoy” message
{N}K , broadcasts (“ack”, {N}K) and finishes execution. Otherwise B continues to the
next step.
(c) Finally, B generates a fresh nonce NB, and broadcasts the message
(“ack”, {“ack”, NA, NB,KB}KA).
It is interesting to see the use of “decoy” messages, to prevent attacks in which an intruder I
prepares a message M = {“hello”, NC ,KA}KB , impersonating principal A. If decoy messages
were not present, then I would send (“hello”,M), and deduce whether A ∈ SB by noticing a
response from B. However, using decoys only helps to confuse an attacker doing traffic analysis,
and breaks down when considering a “timed” intruder, as we will show in the next section.
An Attack Over an Implementation of the Private Authentication protocol
We show an attack in which I can find whether A ∈ SB. The attack is illustrated in Figure 14,
where I is trying to attack A, B and C, which since I does not know their identities are called
X , Y and Z. First, suppose that I 6∈ SB (the attack for the case in which I ∈ SB is analogous).
First I needs to know how long, on average, it takes to B to compute each step of the protocol as
described above. To discover this I could prepare various messages:
1. Firstly, I sends a message (“hello”, {N}K), where K is not the public key of any other
participant. This would generate a number of decoy responses from the other participants,
which I can time (Step 1 in Figure 14, for times x, y and z).
2. Secondly, I sends a message (“hello”, {“hello”, NI ,KI}KB ). Again, this generates decoy
responses from the other parties which I can time (Step 2 in the figure). However, if B
is present, then one response will have longer time (ie. we get times x, z and y′ with y′
longer than y), reflecting the successful decryption and check that I 6∈ SB performed by B
(Recall we assume that I 6∈ SB). Up to this point, I has information that allows him to
infer B’s presence (hence the dashed circle in the figure); Thus, this attack already violates
goal 2 of Abadi’s requirements [2]: B should protect its presence if a party X is willing to
communicate with B but X 6∈ SB (Step 2).
3. Finally, if B is present, then I sends message (“hello”, {“hello”, NI ,KA}KB). This would
generate again the same decoy responses, except one that takes longer (Step 3 in the figure,
for x, z and y′′ with y′′ longer than y′). If this response takes the same time as the above
item, then I can deduce that A 6∈ SB. Otherwise, if the response takes longer (reflecting the
nonce generation NB and encryption performed by B) then I can deduce that A ∈ SB.
If I ∈ SB, then the second step above returns the longest time, and the third message would
take either less time or equal.
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Figure 14: The attack over the PAP protocol, where X , Y and Z are unknown identities by the
intruder I. A, B and C are real identities, with corresponding SA, SB and SC sets; x, y, y
′, y′′
and z are timing values (Dashed circles indicate the intruder’s knowledge of inner values)
20
After recording this information, I has three time values t0, t1 and t2. t0 corresponds to the time
in which B is not present; t1 corresponds to the time in which B is present but its communicating
party X 6∈ SB. Finally, t2 corresponds to the case in which B is present and its communicating
party X ∈ SB. With these values at hand, now an attacker can check if A ∈ SB for an arbitrary
A.
Timing in networks is often accurate but if the accuracy is too low, the intruder can repeat
the timings (i), (ii) and (iii) and perform statistical analysis to increase the probability of the
inferences to be correct [23]. We propose this as future work, when we have a probabilistic, timed
model checker at disposal.
7 Related Work
Many approaches focus on the study of protocols that use timestamps [15, 18, 27, 6, 22]. Recent
work of Delzanno et.al. [15] presents an automatic procedure to verify protocols that use times-
tamps, like the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol. In their work, differently from ours, a global clock
is assumed, and timeouts and retransmissions are not discussed. Evans and Schneider [18] present
a framework for timed analysis. Differently from our (UPPAAL) model checking, it is based on a
semi-decision procedure with discrete time. In that work, the usage of retransmissions is hinted
at as future work, but not (yet) addressed. Lowe [27] also analyses protocols with timing infor-
mation; his work shares with us the model checking approach, although Lowe’s approach is based
on a discrete time model. A global clock is also assumed, and timeouts nor retransmissions are
addressed. Closer to ours is the work of Gorrieri et al. [22], in which a real-time process algebra
is presented for the analysis of time-dependent properties. They focus on compositionality results,
and no model checking is presented. Gorrieri et al. also show how timeouts can be modelled,
although retransmissions are not discussed.
Regarding our timing attack upon Abadi’s protocol, Focardi et al [20] develop formal models
for Felten and Schneider’s web privacy timing attack [19]; their modelling activity shares with our
work the idea of using timed automata for analysis, although our attack illustrates a timing attack
over a “pure” security protocol.
8 Conclusions
Security protocol analysis is a mature field of research that has produced numerous results and
valuable tools for the correct engineering of security protocols. Despite a large body of literature
on the subject, most analysis methods do not take time into consideration (with the exception of
a few papers, considering mainly the use of timestamps). We argue that this is not realistic as all
distributed protocols need to implement timeouts (possibly followed by retransmissions).
In this paper we address some of the issues that need to be considered when including time-
related parameters in the engineering process of a security protocol.
Our first contribution is a method for the design and analysis of security protocols that consider
timing issues. We model security protocols using timed automata, and use UPPAAL to simulate,
debug and verify security protocols in a real time setting. To this end, we employ a general
Dolev Yao style intruder (naturally encoded in UPPAAL), and we remark that modelling the
intruder as a timed automata implicitly extends its power to take into account the time sensitivity.
Our method allows us to specify security protocols in detail, with timeouts and retransmissions.
This increases the confidence in the analysis, since the modelled protocols are closer to their
implementations than the classical analysis (e.g. CASPER [27] or the constraint-based methods
of [28, 10]).
Secondly, by analyzing the protocols in the Clark and Jacob library and the SPORE library,
we see that most protocols schemas (w.r.t. timeouts) fit into a small number of common patterns.
We analyse the efficiency and security of each of the patterns. Still, as possible future work we
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would like to perform a full UPPAAL analysis of each of these literature protocols (just as we do
for Yahalom in Section 4.2).
Other novel and more real-life protocols which are sensitive to timing issues (e.g. besides
timeouts, use for instance puzzles) may benefit from our analysis, e.g. the Host-Identity-Protocol
(HIP), initially analysed by Aura et al. [5].
Our third contribution is an illustration of the implicit information carried by timing. The mere
act of sending a message at a specific moment in time, and not another, carries information. We
propose a novel security protocol that exploits this fact to achieve authentication. The protocol
replaces the standard nonces with timed challenges, which must be replied at specific moments in
time to be successful. Although it is a preliminary idea, it exposes clearly the fact that security
protocols can use and take advantage of time.
Finally we address threats specifically involving timing should also be considered; specifically,
timing attacks. We illustrate these attacks in the context of security protocols, where branching
allows an intruder to deduce information that is intended to be kept secret. Specifically, we
mount an attack over an imperfect implementation of Abadi’s private authentication protocol [2].
Solutions to avoid timing attacks in the implementations are usually expensive (e.g. noise injection
or branch equalization), and it is not our purpose to investigate them. Here we merely lift the
known problem of timing attacks, typically mounted against the cryptosystem to obtain secrets
keys, to security protocols in general where the information leakage can be, in principle, anything.
One possible direction of future work is to consider a timed and probabilistic model checker
(in the lines of [13] or [24]), that would allow us to study the protocols of Section 6. Moreover, a
probabilistic setting would allow us to model, more realistically, the network latency. This, in turn,
would provide us with a finer method to tune sensitive timing values. Another possible direction
for future research would be to implement a compiler from a meta notation (similar to the standard
notation, plus timing information) supporting symbolic terms, to UPPAAL automata. Ultimately,
these directions of future work would contribute to a method of secure systems engineering.
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